The writer
It has been about three years since then-Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin said his country would turn around the security fortunes of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and strengthen their defence capabilities.
When the AES, made up of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, created their own security pact in September 2023 and broke away from France and other Western alliances, it opened doors for Russia to make some inroads in the region troubled by a growing terror threat.
Russia aimed to deepen coordination with ECOWAS and struck deals with the Sahelian States for access to mineral reserves in exchange for military supplies and training.
On paper, the rest of the world is sometimes given the impression of a fruitful partnership contributing to a more secure Sahel. But, Dr. Latyr Tine, a researcher on peace and security, noted a dissonance between the bullish posturing of the AES and the security situation on the ground.
“What we see on the field and what is being said by the armies of these countries is not really the same,” said Tine. “If you see how many terrorist groups are out in the Sahel, it seems the AES and [Russia] cannot really handle the situation.”
The Sahel remains a terrorism hotspot, according to the 2025 Global Terrorism Index. About 51% of global terror-related deaths are recorded in the Sahel, where two al-Qaeda-linked groups are expanding, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the so-called Islamic State groups.
Despite the stark trend, Dr. Ishmael Norman, a Senior Research Fellow at the Ghana Armed Forces Command, said more nuance was needed in assessing Russia’s security footprint in the Sahel. For him, correlation is not necessarily causation when it comes to Russia’s security presence and the worsening terror threat.
He argued that similar correlation could be thrown at France’s departure from the Sahel and the strengthening of terror groups.
“Who was funding the terrorists? Who was arming the terrorist? We cannot lay blame on France directly but circumstantially speaking, there must be a connection between the exit of France in some of these countries to the increase in terrorist activities within the West African subregion,” he remarked.
Ultimately, Norman argued there needed to be measured expectations about Russia’s goals in the Sahel. “What Russia is trying to do is to ensure that countries like America, France don’t have total control over the region,” he explained. “Their presence is not really for control but rather to fill a gap.”
What does Russia say about its security strategy in the Sahel?
At the centre of Russia’s strategy in the Sahel is a belief that long-term security can be achieved with Africans playing a lead role.
“Our approaches in this area are based on unconditional respect for the sovereignty of African states, the principles of mutual respect and equality, non-imposition of ready-made solutions,” Vershinin said in 2023.
While a perceived paternalism and a desire to use force to win the Sahel war on terror defined France’s security intervention, Russia has proven to be more collaborative. Tine acknowledged this key difference, in addition to Russia having significantly less boots on the ground.
France’s counter-terrorism operation in the Sahel, Operation Barkhane, had up to 5100 French soldiers deployed on the ground. Tine noted that Russia may have up to 3,000 boots in the Sahel, significantly less despite the expansion of terror groups since the French left.
The researcher also questioned how much of a priority security in Sahel is to Russia, given its war on Ukraine. There are concerns that Russia is being stretched thin. For example, in 2024, Russia withdrew 100 of its paramilitary officers from Burkina Faso to help in the war in Ukraine.
Over the last decade, Russia has had three main layers to its involvement in the Sahel; military agreements, arms sales, and deployments of mercenaries and state-controlled military companies.
Like the forays of terror groups down South, Russia has also been working to expand its security influence. In 2025, it ratified a military cooperation agreement with Togo that provides for joint exercises, training of Togolese soldiers, and intelligence sharing. There are also plans for a similar arrangement with Benin.
A 2026, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report on Russia’s influence in Africa noted that arms sales reinforce its ties in the Sahel countries by offering reliable equipment which allows for the embedding of Russian systems within local defence infrastructures.
The third layer, the use of mercenaries and state-controlled military companies, has allowed Russia more flexibility in its deployment, to controversial effect. While the Wagner Group, which became the Africa Corps under Russia’s Ministry of Defense, blended combat support and regime security, it has also been implicated in serious atrocities. Notably, a UN report found that Russian mercenaries were behind the March 2022 slaughter of 500 people in the village of Moura in the Mopti region of Mali.
After the Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death in 2023, the change to the Africa Corps has seen a strategy change with the consolidation of its role in AES and a shift towards training its troops.
“They have given a lot of equipment to these armies. I think that can be a strategy they continue rather than having men on the field beside the Malian, Nigerian and Burkinabe armies,” Tine said.
The Bigger ECOWAS Picture
If the goal is security in the Sahel, the experts are clear that the outcome West Africa desires is not necessarily going to come from Russia’s strategies.
Norman wants observers on the continent to appreciate where true accountability lies when it comes to security in the Sahel, among others.
He explained, “It is not Russia that has made the region more vulnerable. It is actually the leadership within the ECOWAS region that has rendered the region a bit vulnerable due to the disconnect between the response to military coup and democratic systems.”
Tine had harsh words for ECOWAS’ disjointed response to the security situation over the years. “What is happening in West Africa is a joke.”
He was critical of the lack of synergy and information sharing from West African countries, even as terror groups grow from strength to strength. Ghana felt the sting of this expansion when seven Ghanaian tomato traders were killed when Islamist insurgents attacked the town of Titao in northern Burkina Faso on February 14, 2026.
“These terrorists do not know borders. They are just operating in areas without thinking about borders between countries, whilst our counters are thinking about borders,” he explained.
Tine believes West African countries do not need to rely on other countries to meet their security needs, and better cohesion is the first step to this vision.
“They have the same destiny. They have the same purpose. They have the same realities, so they have to stay together and move together as far as security is concerned.”
By Delali Adogla-Bessa (deladogla@gmail.com)